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Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans’ Views 
on the Death Penalty 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Samuel R. Gross 
University of Michigan 
American support for the death penalty has steadily increased since 1966, when 
opponents outnumbered supporters, and now in the mid-1990s is at a near record 
high. Research over the last 20 years has tended to confirm the hypothesis that 
most people’s death penalty attitudes (pro or con) are based on emotion rather 
than information or rational argument. People feel strongly about the death 
penalty, know little about it, and feel no need to know more. Factual information 
(e.g., about deterrence and discrimination) is generally irrelevant to people’s 
attitudes, and they are aware that this is so. Support for the death penalty has 
risen for most major felonies. Youth is seen as much less of a mitigating factor 
than it was 35 years ago, but most people still oppose the execution of the 
mentally retarded. As crime rates have risen despite repeated promises by politi- 
cians to “get tough on crime,” the death penalty has become an increasingly 
prominent issue in electoral politics, suggesting that public opinion should be an 
issue of central importance for research. We suggest that future research should 
focus more explicitly on racial attitudes, on comparisons of the death penalty 
with specijic alternatives, and on the emotional aspects of attitudes toward the 
death penalty. 
The best known fact about American attitudes toward capital punishment is 
that support for the death penalty as at a near record high. Figure 1 graphically 
displays this familiar fact in a familiar historical context; it is further documented 
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Hardening of Attitudes 21 
in the Appendix. As measured by public opinion polls, support for capital pun- 
ishment declined through the 1950s to a low of 47% in 1966; increased steadily 
from 1966 through about 1982; and has remained roughly stable since 1982, in 
the range of 70%-75%. 
Figure 2 shows two other well-known facts about American public opinion 
on the death penalty: Throughout the entire period for which poll data are 
available, men have favored the death penalty more than women, and Whites 
have favored it more than Blacks. Other smaller correlations have frequently 
been found: Republicans favor the death penalty more than Democrats, conserva- 
tives more than liberals, the middle class more than the poor, Westerners more 
than Easterners and Midwesterners, suburbanites more than city and country 
dwellers (Bohm, 1991; Erskine, 1970; Fox, Radelet, & Bonsteel, 1991; Smith, 
1976; Zeisel & Gallup, 1989). These demographic variables, however, are weak 
predictors. For example, in a logistic regression model including all of these 
variables plus several others, Fox et al. (1991) were able to predict only 8% of 
the variance in general death penalty opinions on NORC surveys from 1972 
through 1988. 
Several writers have discussed the limitations of the single-question pro/con 
format typically used in general population surveys of death penalty attitudes 
(P. W. Harris, 1986; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974; Wallace, 1989). Answers to this 
kind of question tell us little about what people think or feel or notice-why they 
support or oppose capital punishment, what they know about it, how and to 
whom they believe it should be applied, how this attitude is related to their 
behavior or to other attitudes-the issues to which the bulk of this article is 
devoted.2 Still, these soundings of general opinion are important. 
First, the legal status of the death penalty in the United States depends on 
~~ 
‘The time line displayed in Fig. 1 is based on data from polls by the Gallup organization for 
1936-1971 and for 1981, and on data from the NORC’s General Social Surveys (GSS) for 1972-78, 
for 1980, and for 1982-1991. These choices reflect competing considerations. The General Social 
Survey is the best periodic national opinion poll available, but Gallup has the longest history of 
conducting national surveys that include questions on capital punishment. Therefore, we have used 
GSS data when possible, and Gallup data otherwise. These are not, of course, the only national polls 
on general attitudes toward the death penalty. A computerized data base that is publicly available 
from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut included 90 such 
surveys as of July 1993. The Appendix includes a list of all these surveys, the text of the questions 
asked, and the proportions of respondents giving each coded answer. Unless otherwise attributed, the 
polls we refer to in the text are taken from the Roper data base, which can be accessed through LEXIS 
or WESTLAW, and will be referred to simply by survey organization and the month and year in 
which the survey was completed (e.g., “Gallup, 10/74”). In general, we focus on national surveys, 
and refer to local and regional studies to the extent that they cover ground not covered by the national 
2Two limitations on the scope of this article are appropriate at this point. We do not discuss the 
issue of death penalty attitudes and jury selection in capital cases, commonly known as “death 
qualification” (see Ellsworth, 1988), and we do not discuss the personality correlates of death penalty 
attitudes. 
polls. 








































Hardening of Attitudes 23 
popular support, actual and perceived. In 1972, when the Supreme Court first 
addressed the claim that the death penalty is a “cruel and unusual punishment” 
and therefore unconstitutional, all of the justices agreed that the legality of 
capital punishment depends on its acceptability under contemporary standards 
(Furman v. Georgia, 1972). The Court has maintained this position ever since, 
although various justices have disagreed about the value of opinion polls (as 
opposed to jury behavior and legislative enactments) as a source of information 
on “contemporary standards.” In 1972-with public opinion on capital punish- 
ment fairly evenly split, but support on the rise-the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Furman left the legal status of the death penalty in doubt. The Court held that 
all existing death sentences in the country were unconstitutional because they had 
been imposed under systems that permitted the “arbitrary” use of capital punish- 
ment, but it deferred a decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty as 
such. Four years later, when the Court revisited the issue and decided that capital 
punishment is constitutional (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976), the public was unmis- 
takably pro-death penalty-as the polls revealed-and it has remained so ever 
since. 
In the long run, popular support may not be sugicient to guarantee the 
retention of the death penalty. As Zimring and Hawkins (1986) have pointed out, 
in the past 30 years capital punishment has been abolished in West Germany, 
Great Britain, Canada, and France, despite majority support. The same could 
happen in the United States, although not likely soon. On the other hand, popular 
support may well be necessary to the continued use of the death penalty in this 
country. If a clear majority comes to reject this form of punishment, we predict 
that the Supreme Court, if not Congress and the state legislatures, will soon 
follow suit. 
Second, general opinions about the death penalty are subjectively important 
to many, perhaps most, people in this society. For example, in November 1986, 
65% of the respondents in an Associated Press/Media General poll of the nation- 
al adult population said that the death penalty is an issue they “feel very strongly 
about.” This may not surprise anybody who watches TV news or reads news- 
papers in America. But it is surprising to learn that on an ABC News exit poll of 
23,000 voters in the 1988 presidential election, 27% checked “the candidates’ 
positions on the death penalty” as an issue that was “very important” to them in 
choosing between George Bush and Michael Dukakis. The only item that scored 
higher was abortion (33%); the presidential debates and the candidates’ stands on 
illegal drugs were close behind (26% each); the candidates’ political parties 
scored 23%; and their positions on matters such as education (22%), health care 
(21%), and social security (19%) all trailed. 
Perhaps capital punishment is so important to people because it has become 
a point on which people do not so much form opinions as choose sides: I am for 
the death penalty, George Bush is for the death penalty, Michael Dukakis is 
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against the death penalty. To the extent that this is true, the critical step is self- 
identification as a supporter or an opponent of capital punishment-and general 
opinion questions, however vague, may be perfectly suited to determine that 
identification. Indeed, the patterns of answers to these questions offer some 
slight evidence that death penalty attitudes are a matter of self-identification. 
Inevitably, the precise distribution of responses to death penalty questions 
varies from survey to survey even within short periods of time. Most such 
differences are in the range from 1% to 5%, and are easily explained by random 
sampling error, and by the multitude of possible problems in the design and 
implementation of mass surveys. What is more striking, from our point of view, 
is the absence of systematic direrences between the results of competing polls 
that phrase their questions about capital punishment differently. The usual ques- 
tion asked on the General Social Survey (GSS) is, “Do you favor or oppose the 
death penalty for persons convicted of murder?’ Before 198 1, the usual Gallup 
question was, “Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of 
murder?’ Harris polls generally ask, “Do you believe in capital punishment (the 
death penalty) or are you opposed?’ None of the differences between these 
formats, or among the half-dozen other questions that we have grouped together 
in Appendix 1 under the heading “Standard Question,” has any noticeable impact 
on the answers. Consider, for example, the results of three polls conducted in 
1976: GSS, 4176-Favor 66%, Oppose 30%, Don’t know 5%; Gallup, 4/76- 
Yes 66%, No 26%, No opinion 7%; Harris, 12176-Favor 67%; Oppose 25%; 
Not sure 8%. 
Experiments using different forms of survey questions have shown that 
some variations in wording are likely to matter much more than others. For 
example, formal balance (“favor or oppose” vs. “favor”) usually makes little 
difference (Schuman & Presser, 1981, pp. 180-184). By contrast, providing a 
context for the opinion (“If [another] situation like Vietnam were to develop,” 
should the United States “send troops” vs. should the United States “send 
troops to stop a communist takeover”) often changes the results by a substantial 
margin (Schuman & Presser, 1981, pp. 275-296)-but on this issue it makes 
no difference. Indeed, the distribution of responses remains roughly unchanged 
even when aggravated categories of death-worthy crimes are mentioned. Com- 
pare, for example, the 12/82 Yankelovitch survey question (“Wider use of the 
death penalty for such crimes as hijacking or killing a police ogZcer”-73% 
favor) to the standard question on the 4/83 GSS survey (73% favor). Nor does it 
seem to make much of a difference if a popular justification for the death 
penalty is spelled out. For example, the 6/84 AP/Media General survey asked, 
“Various proposals have been made as possible solutions to the increased crime 
rate. Please tell me whether you personally favor or oppose the following mea- 
sures to reduce the crime rate . . . .” The death penalty alternative got about 
the same level of “Favor” responses (69%) as the death penalty questions on a 
1/84 Roper survey, which referred to “. . . serious crimes such as murder, 
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kidnapping, etc.” (68%), and the 4/84 GSS (70%), which asked the standard 
question. 
The form of endorsement of the death penalty that is offered also appears to 
make little difference. It can be “Are there any crimes for which the death penalty is 
justi$ed?” (CBS/NYT, 7/77,7/88,4/89), or “Do you favor or oppose . . . bring- 
ing back the death penalty?’ (Yankelovitch, 9183, 12/83,9/84), and the levels of 
support are close to those obtained with general attitude questions. It does not 
matter if the respondents are asked whether they would vote for a proposition 
favoring the death penalty (Gallup, 10174,9182); nor-despite large acquiescence 
response bias effects in other contexts (Schuman & Presser, 1981, pp. 203-230)- 
does it matter if they are required to state that they would vote to oppose 
“Amending the constitution to outlaw the death penalty” (NBC/ Wall Street Jour- 
nal, 12/91). The only changes in question format that seem to have predictable 
effects on levels of support are those that deal with the frequency of death 
sentences. On the one hand, questions that ask whether the respondents favor a 
mandatory death penalty produce substantially lower support; for example, com- 
pare the 12/81 Gallup survey (54% favor mandatory death penalty) to the 4/82 
GSS (74% generally favor death penalty). On the other hand, some surveys ask 
whether, among “persons convicted of first degree murder,” the death penalty 
should be given to “all,” “no one,” or whether it “should depend on the circum- 
stances of the case and the character of the person.” If we interpret the answer “no 
one” as opposition to capital punishment, and “all” and “depends” as support, 
these questions produce a sizable pro-death penalty shift; for example, compare 
the 4/73 Harris survey “All” + “Depends” = 8 1%) to the 4/73 GSS (60% general 
support for capital punishment). 
It seems that most Americans know whether they “favor” or “oppose” the 
death penalty, and say so in response to any question that can reasonably be 
interpreted as addressing that issue. This conclusion is reinforced by evidence 
that the form of the response categories has little effect on overall levels of 
expressed support for capital punishment. Several surveys have allowed respon- 
dents to say that they favor or oppose the death penalty “strongly” or “somewhat” 
(L.A. Times, 4/81, 7/86, 3/89), or “very strongly” and “not too strongly” (Gal- 
lup, 1/86). The total proportions on each side of the neutral point are consistent 
with roughly contemporaneous surveys that offered only two choices. In addi- 
tion, three Los Angeles Times surveys (3/85, 7/86, 3/89) offered the choice “I 
haven’t heard enough about that to say.” Similar manipulations have been shown 
to have dramatic consequences in related contexts. For example, Schuman and 
Presser (1981, p. 120) describe an experiment on the 1974 GSS in which the 
following question was asked to a split sample in two forms, with and without 
the italicized portion: “In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too 
harshly or not harshly enough with criminals, or don’t you have enough informa- 
tion about the courts ro say?” In the first form 6.8% volunteered that they didn’t 
know; in the second 29% chose “Not enough information to say.” By compari- 
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son, only 4% of the respondents in the 1989 Los Angeles Times survey said that 
they “hadn’t heard enough” to express an opinion on the death penalty (an 
additional 9% said they were not sure or refused to answer), and only 2% said so 
on the other two surveys that offered this option. 
Expressed Reasons for Death Penalty Attitudes 
Before 1970, almost no one thought to ask survey respondents why they 
favored or opposed the death penalty. Since then several researchers have at- 
tempted to do so; their general conclusion is that simply asking people about the 
reasons for their attitudes is not an effective means of discovering those reasons. 
Ellsworth and Ross (1983), for example, found that respondents tended to en- 
dorse all “reasons” that were consistent with their basic position. If they favored 
capital punishment, they agreed with almost all the reasons for support; if they 
opposed capital punishment, they agreed with almost all the reasons for opposi- 
tion. Ellsworth and Ross concluded that most people’s attitudes toward capital 
punishment are basically emotional. The “reasons” are determined by the atti- 
tude, not the reverse. 
Even though it now seems naive to think we can discover the reasons for 
people’s attitudes toward capital punishment simply by asking direct questions, 
an examination of people’s expressed reasons can still be illuminating. Overall 
levels of support for the death penalty are far higher than they were in 1973, 
executions have resumed, thousands of people are now on death row, and there 
have been conspicuous cases of innocent people narrowly escaping execution. 
Do people give the same reasons for their attitudes as they did 20 years ago? 
There are two basic methods for asking people about reasons for their death 
penalty attitudes. The first is to provide a list of possible reasons for supporting 
or opposing the death penalty and to ask respondents which ones they agree with. 
The second, less common, is simply to ask the open-ended question, “Why do 
you favor (or oppose) capital punishment?” The first method is susceptible to the 
problem discovered by Ellsworth and Ross (1983): Any reason on the list that 
supports one’s basic attitude is likely to be endorsed, and the only way to 
differentiate among them is to look at relative strength of endorsement. The 
second method is potentially much more useful, as it does not suggest reasons to 
respondents that they had not previously entertained. However, people are often 
unaware of the bases for their attitudes, and if they have not thought much about 
why they favor or oppose the death penalty they may not be able to give valid 
answers (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Deterrence and Retribution 
Twenty years ago the reason most commonly given for supporting the death 
penalty was that it was a deterrent to crime (Thomas, 1977; Thomas & Foster, 
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1975; Vidmar, 1974; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974). At that time the deterrent 
effectiveness of the death penalty was a hotly debated issue, and surveys of death 
penalty attitudes began to include questions about belief in deterrence. Thus, 
unlike other rationales for the death penalty, we have two decades of comparable 
data on belief in deterrence. The top portion of Fig. 3 shows the percent of 
people supporting the death penalty, and the percent of people agreeing that the 
death penalty is a deterrent to murder (or crime, the wording varies slightly from 
one poll to the next) in surveys of nationwide random samples of adults from 
1972 to 1991. Only polls that offered two alternatives, rather than scales of belief 
strength, are presented, for the sake of comparability. 
It is clear that the marked increase in support for the death penalty is not due 
to a growing belief that the death penalty is a deterrent to murder. Belief in the 
deterrent efficacy of the death penalty hovers around 60% for most of the 19-year 
period, while support for the death penalty rises from 58% to 75%. Indeed, a 
number of recent polls indicate that people believe other measures, such as job 
training and drug rehabilitation programs, are more effective than capital punish- 
ment in reducing crime (Bowers, 1993; Bowers & Vandiver, 1991a,b). 
Proponents of capital punishment, of course, are far more likely than oppo- 
nents to agree that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent than life 
imprisonment. In their 1974 survey of California Bay Area residents, Ellsworth 
and Ross (1983) found that 93% of proponents agreed that “the death penalty is a 
more effective deterrent than life imprisonment,” while 92% of opponents dis- 
agreed, and many other polls have found that belief in deterrence is highly 
correlated with support for the death penalty. However, in their attempt to find 
out whether people’s belief in deterrence was a fundamental reason for people’s 
death penalty attitudes, Ellsworth and Ross (1983) asked people whether their 
basic position on the death penalty would change if it could be proven that they 
were wrong about its deterrent efficacy. They found that most proponents would 
still favor the death penalty if life imprisonment were an equally effective deter- 
rent, and most opponents would still oppose it even if it were a “much more 
effective” deterrent than life imprisonment. The same hypothetical question was 
added to the Gallup Poll in 1985, with very similar results. Proponents would 
still favor the death penalty if it “does not lower the murder rate” (72%, 73%, and 
69% in 1985, 1986, and 1991, respectively), and opponents would still oppose it 
if it were a deterrent (67%, 71%, 65%; Gallup News Service, 1991). Thus 
current public opinion poll data continue to support the conclusion that people’s 
attitudes about the death penalty are not determined by their beliefs in its deter- 
rent effectiveness. 
The other major reason for favoring the death penalty is retribution. Com- 
mentators in the early 1970s (Thomas & Foster, 1975; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 
1974) argued that an expressed belief in deterrence was a more socially accept- 
able, “legitimate” rationale for supporting the death penalty than the more emo- 
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Fig. 3. Reasons given for death penalty support. The top two lines show the percentage of Americans supporting the death penalty and 
the percentage agreeing that the death penalty deters crime (yes-no questions). The deterrence questions are taken from the following 
national samples: Opinion Research Corp. 7/72; Harris 4/73; CBS/New York Times 1/77, 7/77, 3/90, 8/90; Research & Forecasts 
5/80; Audits & Surveys 10/81; Gallup 1/85, 1/86, 6/91. For 1973, and all years from 1985 to 1991, the general support questions 
come from the same surveys; for the other years the data points are from the surveys reported in Fig. 1. 
The lower four lines show responses to open-ended questions asking, “Why do you favor the death penalty?” The data are from the 
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reason people were willing to offer to pollsters. Several scholars have suggested 
that the norms of social desirability have changed, and that retribution is now an 
acceptable reason for favoring the death penalty (Fox et al., 1991; Haney, Hurtado, 
& Vega, 1993; P. W. Harris, 1986; Warr & Stafford, 1984). As support for the 
death penalty has increased, so has willingness to endorse retribution as a motive. 
The measurement of people’s belief in retribution is much more problematic 
than the measurement of their death penalty attitudes or their belief in deterrence. 
We have seen that changes in question wording have little effect on general levels 
of support for the death penalty, and the same is true for belief in deterrence. For 
example, the 1980 and 1981 polls reported in Fig. 3 were conducted by two 
different organizations (Research & Forecasts, 5/80; Audits & Surveys, 10/81). 
The first asked, “Does the death penalty discourage murder?’ The second asked, 
“Do you believe that capital punishment-the death penalty-is or is not a 
deterrent to crime?” In both cases 63% of the population expressed a belief in 
deterrence. Harris (4/73) found the same level of belief in the deterrent superi- 
ority of capital punishment over life imprisonment, regardless of whether “life 
imprisonment” included parole as an option. Retribution questions, on the other 
hand, can be phrased in terms of a principled belief in justice, a merciless passion 
of revenge, or anywhere in between. Very few researchers have used agree- 
disagree retribution questions comparable to the deterrence questions, and every 
survey phrases the question differently. Not surprisingly, endorsement of items 
designed to tap retributive sentiments ranges from quite low (when words like 
“revenge” are used) to quite high. The variation due to question wording makes it 
impossible to tell if there has been any long-term trend. 
Since 1980 there have been three national random-sample polls that asked 
open-ended questions about respondents’ reasons for supporting or opposing the 
death penalty (ABC NewslWashington Post, 5181; Gallup 1985 and 1991, reported 
in Gallup Poll News Service, July 26, 1991). The lower graph on Fig. 3 presents 
these data. Retribution (“a life for a life”) has been a more popular reason than 
belief in deterrence since 1981. It is possible that people were more reluctant to 
express retributive motives a decade earlier, but we have no comparable data. 
Support for the law of talion has increased over the past 10 years, but far more 
striking is the marked decrease in the proportion of people who spontaneously give 
general deterrence as their reason (see also Warr & Stafford, 1984). Retribution is 
by far the most common reason given for favoring the death penalty. 
cost 
Figure 3 shows a slight upward trend in people’s willingness to mention the 
cost of keeping a person in prison. When we developed our list of possible 
justifications for the death penalty in 1973 (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983), we inter- 
viewed death penalty supporters in depth to try to make sure we covered the 
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range of possible reasons. No one mentioned the high cost of prison, and we did 
not include it. Apparently discussing human lives in monetary terms was even 
more unacceptable than believing in revenge (45% of proponents we sampled 
agreed that “society has a right to get revenge when a very serious crime like 
murder has been committed”). People have become less hesitant to mention cost 
spontaneously (Gallup Poll News Service, 1991), and when cost is explicitly 
included as an alternative, a substantial minority of proponents endorse it. In 
1986 P. W. Harris found that 38% of those who favored a death penalty in all 
circumstances and 21% of those who favored it in some circumstances endorsed 
“the high cost of imprisonment” as one of their reasons. If this is a genuine basis 
for supporting the death penalty, it is a misguided one; the available evidence 
suggests that the death penalty is far more expensive than life imprisonment 
(Cook & Slawson, 1993; Costanzo & White, this issue; Dieter, 1992). 
Incapacitation 
Finally, Fig. 3 indicates that only 20% or fewer respondents give 
incapacitation-keeping a particular killer from killing again-as a reason for 
favoring the death penalty, and there is no clear trend over the decade. However, 
a series of recent studies aimed at discovering whether there are any alternatives 
to capital punishment that would satisfy the public (Bowers, 1993; Bowers & 
Vandiver, 1991a, 1991b; Dieter, 1993) suggests that incapacitation may be more 
important to people than their responses have indicated. 
We have argued, as have many others (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; P. W. 
Harris, 1986; Tyler & Weber, 1982; Wallace, 1989), that death penalty attitudes 
are an aspect of people’s ideological self-definition, and that they are strongly 
held. Bowers (1993) argues that the apparent strength of people’s commitment to 
capital punishment may be due to the fact that survey questions rarely allow them 
to compare it with any alternative; either no alternative is given or “life imprison- 
ment” is presented without further specification. Twenty years ago it made no 
difference whether “life imprisonment” or “life imprisonment without parole” 
was included as the alternative to the death penalty (Harris, 4/73), but there are 
reasons to believe times have changed. First, an increasing number of studies 
indicates that most people, including jurors in capital cases (Bowers, 1993; 
Dieter, 1993) do not believe “life imprisonment” means anything of the sort. In a 
recent study, only 4% of respondents believed murderers sentenced to life actu- 
ally spend their whole lives in jail; the average estimate of a “life sentence” was 
15.6 years (Costanzo & Costanzo, 1994; Dieter, 1993). In states where the only 
alternative to the death penalty is life without parole, few citizens realize that this 
is so (Dieter, 1993). (In California, the state does not leave these impressions to 
chance. The jury in a capital case is instructed by the judge that “a Governor may 
in the future commute or modify a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole to . . . include the possibility of parole.” [California v. 
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Ramos, 19821.) Second, Willie Horton and other high-publicity cases have made 
the image of the released prisoner who immediately commits new atrocities 
highly available to the public. 
Bowers asks respondents, “If convicted murderers in this state could be 
sentenced to life in prison with absolutely no chance of ever being released on 
parole or returning to society, would you prefer this as an alternative to the death 
penalty?’ In all five states (California, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New York) 
where this question has been asked, more people have preferred this form of life 
imprisonment (Bowers, 1993). Adding a requirement that the murderer “be re- 
quired to work in prison industries for money that would go to the families of 
their victims” further diminishes support for the death penalty. Dieter (1993) 
replicated these results in a national poll. 
Both incapacitation and retribution probably play a role in people’s willing- 
ness to endorse these alternatives. People want to be absolutely sure that vicious 
murderers never ever have a chance to victimize anyone else (outside of prison), 
and they do not believe “life imprisonment” currently provides that sort of 
guarantee. But they also want to be sure the murderer never ever has a chance to 
live a normal life, because he does not deserve to. The addition of a commitment 
to contribute to the victim’s family adds a further element of retribution-in the 
form of restitution-and undercuts the argument that death is the only punish- 
ment that could recompense the surviving victims. 
There are problems with demand characteristics in Bowers’ work. The 
question wording is very strong, and the alternatives to the death penalty are 
arranged in a sequence of severity from “parole after 25 years” to “parole after 40 
years” to “absolutely no chance of parole” to “no chance of parole” plus restitu- 
tion. Also, we must remember that (as on all contemporary surveys) strong 
majorities in each of these states do support the death penalty under the conditions 
that they believe actually prevail. In that context, it’s hard to say what these results 
mean. Would anything short of death convince most Americans that there is really 
no chance that a prisoner will ever return to society? Is the popularity of real “life 
without parole” best understood as a qualification on popular support for the death 
penalty, or as an expression of cynicism about the prison system? Despite these 
problems, this is the first new approach to studying attitudes toward capital 
punishment in many years, and the first approach that has suggested that there 
might be substantial flexibility on the part of those who favor the death penalty. 
Emotions 
Many commentators have argued that death penalty attitudes are not based 
on rational considerations at all, but are fundamentally noninstrumental symbolic 
attitudes, based on emotions and ideological self-image (Ellsworth & Ross, 
1983; Gorecki, 1983; P. W. Harris, 1986; Tyler & Weber, 1982; Wallace, 1989). 
Oddly enough, despite the popularity of this idea, hardly anyone has asked 
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respondents questions that give them the opportunity to express their emotions 
directly, and some have intentionally confined their response alternatives to those 
that are rational (P. W. Harris, 1986). Perhaps researchers have feared that 
respondents might be reluctant to express emotional bases for their attitudes, but 
this fear may be groundless. Ellsworth and Ross (1983), for example, found that 
79% of these who favored the death penalty said that they had sometimes “felt a 
sense of personal outrage when a convicted murderer was sentenced to a penalty 
less than death,” and 34% said that the death of a murderer could give them “a 
sense of personal satisfaction.” In any case, we will not find out unless we ask. 
Emotions are becoming a legitimate topic in the study of other political attitudes 
(Kinder, 1994), and we would hope to see the emotional correlates of death 
penalty attitudes studied directly, rather than being inferred from the failure of 
nonemotional beliefs to be very informative. 
Reasons for Opposing Capital Punishment 
Many fewer polls have asked why the opponents oppose capital punish- 
ment. This may be partly because by the time survey researchers started asking 
detailed questions about reasons, the proponents were a clear majority, so their 
views were more relevant to public policy. It may be because the clash between 
utilitarian reasons (deterrence, cost) and reasons based on values (retribution) is 
less salient. 
Just as most proponents say they would still favor the death penalty if it had 
no deterrent effect, most opponents would still oppose it even if it were an 
effective deterrent (61%, 71%, and 65% in 1985, 1986, and 1991, respectively; 
Gallup Poll News Service, 1991). Thus, like the attitudes of the proponents, 
attitudes of most opponents are very strong, and not based on utilitarian consider- 
ations. They are willing to sacrifice lives to avoid having a death penalty. On the 
other hand, saying that they would be unmoved by evidence of superior deter- 
rence does not reflect any inconsistency: When asked why they oppose the death 
penalty, opponents rarely refer to its failure as a deterrent. In response to open- 
ended questions in surveys over the last 10 years, only 5%-10% of opponents 
mentioned deterrence. Other “utilitarian” reasons, such as the unfair application 
of the penalty, the risk of executing innocent people, or the possibility of reha- 
bilitation, are also very infrequently mentioned as reasons for opposition. 
People oppose the death penalty because they think it is wrong. In 1981, 
1985, and 1991 (ABCIWashington Post, 5/81; Gallup Poll News Service, 1991) 
the most commonly given “reason” has been that it is “wrong to take a life” (or 
the slightly more ambiguously coded “taking a life solves nothing”), and the 
proportion of opponents giving this opinion has held steady at about 40%. The 
next most popular reason is basically that same reason with an explicitly religious 
rationale, e.g., “punishment should be left to God.” 
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People favor the death penalty because they think killing is wrong: “a life 
for a life” is the most popular reason spontaneously given for supporting it. For 
both proponents and opponents, their preferred rationale is moral and absolute; 
they are taking a stand that brooks no argument and suggests little differentiation. 
Such attitudes are unlikely to be swayed by arguments based on factual informa- 
tion. 
Knowledge and Belie& 
In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia (1972), Justice Thurgood 
Marshall argued that popular support for the death penalty was based on igno- 
rance. There are two parts to this famous hypothesis: (1) The American public is 
generally unaware of several unhappy “facts” about capital punishment-that it 
does not deter homicide more than long terms of imprisonment, that its operation 
is inhumane, that its administration is discriminatory, that convicted murderers 
are rarely executed, and that they pose little future threat to society (pp. 364- 
365). (2) If these “facts” were well known, “the great mass of citizens . . . 
would conclude that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional” 
(p. 363). Virtually all the published studies on the relationship between death 
penalty attitudes and factual knowledge were conducted in response to this 
Marshall Hypothesis; the two best, within three years after Furman. 
Sarat and Vidmar (1976) interviewed 181 residents of Amherst, Massa- 
chusetts, in 1975. Most of their respondents knew that capital punishment is 
rarely imposed and that it is subject to discrimination by wealth (59% on each 
item), but few knew that “studies have shown” that it does not deter homicide 
(36% and 22%, depending on the form of the question). They conclude that the 
first step in the Marshall Hypothesis is supported in part: their respondents were 
reasonably well informed on the use of the death penalty, but ill informed on its 
efects. Ellsworth and Ross (1983) provide more detailed data on a survey of 500 
northern Californians in 1974, which also revealed widespread ignorance. Most 
respondents, from 54% to 89%, did not know that most Western European 
countries had abolished capital punishment, that comparisons across time and 
jurisdiction fail to show that the death penalty deters, that it is more costly than 
life imprisonment, and so forth. In general, opponents of the death penalty were 
more likely to answer correctly, but, as the authors note, this does not necessarily 
mean that they were better informed. It is also possible that the two groups were 
equally ignorant, but each tended to agree with the items supporting their posi- 
tion. This would create a bias, since on most of the items the correct answer was 
consistent with the anti-death penalty position. In addition, supporters and oppo- 
nents were in general agreement on several issues. Majorities in both camps 
(62% and 81%, respectively) agreed correctly on the discrimination item, and 
pluralities agreed incorrectly on relative cost and abolition in Europe. The only 
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strong differences were on several items related to deterrence and on a related 
item concerning the average length of time served under a life ~en tence .~  
Ellsworth and Ross also found a great deal of uncertainty about the opera- 
tion and effects of the death penalty. Many respondents happily checked “I have 
no idea” in response to these questions. On a 5-point scale, this admission of 
ignorance drew from 25% to 49% of the respondents on seven of nine informa- 
tion items, and was the modal response on four. The exceptions were the cost 
item (16% said “I have no idea”-but only 1 1  % answered correctly that capital 
punishment is not cheaper than life imprisonment) and an item on discrimination 
by wealth (9% had “no idea,” and 68% correctly said that poor murderers were 
more likely to be sentenced to death). Both of these questions seem to call for 
common sense social-economic reasoning; in one case, common sense is proba- 
bly accurate, in the other it is misleading. Equally striking is the tentativeness 
with which those respondents who did have an idea answered. On every item, 
those who said, “I think it’s true,” outnumbered those who said, “I’m sure it’s 
true,” and those who said, “I think it’s false,” outnumbered those who said, “I’m 
sure it’s false.” These comparisons hold for respondents who favor the death 
penalty, oppose it, or are undecided. In only 1 out of 36 possible comparisons did 
those who were sure (pro or con) outnumber those in the same group who had 
tentative thoughts in the same direction. 
The second step in Justice Marshall’s argument-that if the facts were 
known, capital punishment would be rejected-is an expression of democratic 
optimism: knowledge persuades. Unfortunately, the best study on the point is 
discouraging. Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) compared subjects who believed 
the death penalty deters homicide and subjects who believed it does not. Both 
groups were given a pair of fictitious studies, one providing data that clearly 
supported the deterrence hypothesis and the other strongly refuting it. In each 
group (and regardless of the methodologies of the studies) the subjects accepted 
the evidence that favored the position they already held, and rejected the contrary 
evidence. The net effect of reading two balanced but contradictory studies was 
that prior beliefs were strengthened and preexisting differences were polarized. 
Similarly, Roberts (1984) found that pro- and anti-death penalty subjects remem- 
bered those portions of stimulus literature that supported their positions. 
The world, however, does not have the same structure as Lord et al.’s 
3Ellsworth and Ross (1983) also included the item, “In several cases people executed for murder 
in the United States were later proven innocent.” Supporters of capital punishment were less likely 
than opponents to agree with this statement, 46% to 66%, and more likely to reject it, 23% to 10%. 
Ellsworth and Ross, in keeping with the accepted wisdom of the time, interpreted the claim as false, 
and agreement with it as error. More recent research, however, suggests that several people executed 
for murder in the United States were indeed later proven innocent by reliable means (e .g . ,  a death bed 
confession of the true criminal) if not in formal judicial proceedings (Radelet, Bedau, & Putnam, 
1992). 
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elegant study. Facts about the death penalty are not neatly balanced; as Justice 
Marshall wrote, on the important factual issues that have been in dispute (deter- 
rence, cost, discrimination, consistency) the truth is on the side of anti-death 
penalty arguments. Moreover, some citizens (unlike the subjects in this study) 
have weak opinions on the death penalty, or are entirely undecided. Sarat and 
Vidmar (1976) examined the effect of information on attitudes by asking their 
respondents to read one or both of two 1500 word essays containing information 
about Utilitarian aspects of capital punishment (deterrence and recidivism) and 
Humanitarian aspects (discrimination and the process of executions); a control 
group was given an unrelated essay about other legal issues. A posttest of the 
respondents’ death penalty attitudes seemed to support Justice Marshall. The 
informational essays did produce a shift in the direction of opposition to capital 
punishment; the Utilitarian essay produced a larger change than the Human- 
itarian, and the combination was more effective than either separately. 
A close review of these findings shows them to be entirely consistent with 
Lord et al. Sarat and Vidmar measured death penalty attitudes on a 7-point scale, 
from “very strongly in favor” to “very strongly opposed.” In the three experimen- 
tal conditions, only 4% (1/24) of respondents who favored the death penalty 
“very strongly” changed their attitude in the expected direction, and only 21% 
(6/28) of those who favored it “strongly.” By comparison, 57% (34/60) of 
respondents who were “uncertain” or who favored or opposed the death penalty 
“somewhat” moved in the direction of opposition. Moreover, only 2 of the 46 
respondents whose attitudes changed to any extent (4%) moved from any posi- 
tion in support for the death penalty to any level of opposition. All other shifts 
were changes of intensity within groups (primarily among the less intense) and 
movement in and out of the undecided group. This suggests that general knowl- 
edge of the truths that Justice Marshall wanted to teach the public would have 
only a modest effect on public opinion. At most, it might increase opposition by 
about the proportion of people who are undecided-currently around 8%-and it 
would probably have little or no impact on those who support the death penalty 
most strongly. 
Recent national poll data are consistent with this conclusion. We have 
already discussed the data on beliefs about deterrence. In addition, Gallup polls 
in 1985 and 1991 found that 39% and 45% of the respondents, respectively, 
agreed that Blacks are more likely to be sentenced to death than Whites. On the 
same polls, 64% and 60% agreed that poor defendants were more likely to be 
sentenced to death than rich defendants. Gallup (Gallup Poll News Service, 
199 1) also reports that Black respondents were considerably more likely than 
Whites to agree that these forms of discrimination take place, 73%-41% for race 
and 72%-59% for poverty. Similarly, on a 11/86 AP/Media General poll, 50% 
said that the death penalty “Is not carried out fairly,” and only 32% said that it “Is 
carried out fairly.” Given the overall levels of support for the death penalty since 
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1985, the inescapable conclusion is that a large proportion of the American 
public already believes the death penalty is unfair, but supports it nonetheless. 
Who Should be Sentenced to Death? 
Mandatory vs. Discretionary Death Penalty 
When the Supreme Court declared current capital punishment statutes un- 
constitutional in 1972, it did so on the ground that the discretion allowed to jurors 
in deciding who should live and who should die was so unlimited that the choice 
was ultimately arbitrary (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). Some states attempted to 
remedy this arbitrariness by instituting mandatory capital punishment: everyone 
convicted of specified categories of murder would automatically be sentenced to 
death. In 1976 the Supreme Court held that mandatory death penalties are uncon- 
stitutional (Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976; Roberts v. Louisiana, 1976). The 
public apparently shares the view that not everyone who is eligible for the death 
penalty should get it. Support for a mandatory death penalty is consistently 
weaker than general support for the death penalty (see above, p. 25), although it 
too has grown in the recent past. When respondents are given a choice between a 
mandatory and a discretionary death penalty, they prefer the latter. The Harris 
poll included this question in 4/73, 12/76, 1/83, and Gallup in 7/85. Except for 
1976, when there was only a slight preference for a discretionary death penalty, 
over 50% of those polled favored a discretionary death penalty, while fewer than 
30% favored a mandatory death penalty. 
Further, some of those who express support for a “mandatory” death penalty 
do not think that everyone convicted should be executed. Ellsworth and Ross 
(1983) found that the percentage of people who said that 100% of those con- 
victed of a given crime should be executed was always lower than the percentage 
of people who endorsed a “mandatory” death penalty for that crime. In that same 
survey, some opponents of the death penalty felt the proportion of people who 
should be executed for a given crime should be greater than zero. It is clear that 
proponents of mandatory death penalties want the discretion to spare an occa- 
sional sympathetic killer, while some opponents of capital punishment want the 
discretion to execute a few especially villainous ones. Most people prefer a death 
penalty that allows the decision maker to make distinctions in every case. 
Most capital sentencing statutes attempt to codify the important distinctions 
by providing juries with lists of aggravating factors that might justify a sentence 
of death, while reminding them that any factor may be considered as a justifica- 
tion for rejecting the death penalty. No national poll has examined people’s views 
of the kinds of considerations that should distinguish between life and death for a 
given crime, although a few smaller scale surveys have done so (e.g., Haney et 
al., 1993; Harris, 1986). The national polls have focused primarily on the types 
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of crimes that should be punishable by death, and occasionally on the type of 
criminal. 
Which Crimes Should be Punishable by Death? 
Table 1 displays levels of support for the death penalty for selected crimes, 
based on nationwide surveys using questions of the general form, “Do you favor 
the death penalty for the crime of X?’ Questions allowing the three options 
“death for all,” “death for some,” and “death for none” generally show higher 
levels of support when the “all” and “some” categories are combined. Open- 
ended questions (“What do you think should be the penalty for X?’) generally 
show lower levels. 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the table is that the rise in 
general support for the death penalty has been accompanied by an across-the- 
board rise in support for capital punishment for the various specific crimes. 
Table 1. Percent Favoring the Death Penalty for Specific Crimes 
Crime 
Kill Police/ 







1978 66 32 
1979 
1980 57 




1985 76 45 
1986 71 54 
1987 70 
















Note. The data are from national polls asking yes-no questions of the format, “Do you favor the 
death penalty for the crime of X?” The sources are as follows: Hijacking-1972 Opinion Research 
Corp., all other years Gallup; Terrorism-Hams; Rape-1986 Associated PresslMedia General, all 
other years Gallup; Paid killing--1986 Associated PresslMedia General, all other years Roper; Child 
Sexual Molestation-Associated Press/Media General; Killing a policeman or prison guard- 1972 
Opinion Research Corp.; 1974, 1976, 1980 Roper; 1986 Associated Press/Media General. The 
sources of the data on Murder are described in footnote 1. 
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These trends can also be seen in the percentage of people who favor death as the 
penalty for crimes not included in the table: arson, robbery, hijacking, or kidnap- 
ping in which someone is killed (Roper 3/74, 3/76, 4/80); and assassination of 
high public officials (Roper, 3/74, 3/76, 4/80; Gallup, 11/85, 9/88). In general 
death is favored more for the crimes involving killing, although a substantial 
number of people also favor death for rape, hijacking, and spying. 
It also seems that particular crimes are singled out for death when they have 
attracted public attention. For example, public support for the death penalty for 
rape and for terrorism has increased much more during the past 15 years than 
support for the execution of people who kill police officers or prison guards. The 
feminist movement has clearly affected public consciousness about the serious- 
ness of rape, and terrorism has become a much more salient issue. Salient crimes 
change with the times. In 1942, in wartime, 85% of a nationwide sample spontu- 
neously named the death penalty as the appropriate punishment for spies (Gallup, 
7/42); since then a majority has always opposed it. In 1986 the sexual molesta- 
tion of a child became a survey item for the first time, and 35% of the population 
favored the death penalty for this crime (AP/Media General, 11/86); it would be 
wonderful to know what people would have said in 1970, or 1960, or 1950, 
before the crime was widely publicized. 
Another media crime of the late 1980s and 1990s is drug dealing. In a 6/51 
Gallup poll, in response to an open-ended question, 14% of Americans said they 
favored the death penalty for “selling drugs to teenagers.” In 1969 only 2% 
mentioned the death penalty as a possible punishment for “dope peddling” (Gal- 
lup, 1/69); in both years, the plurality favored long prison sentences. Those are 
the only two national surveys before 1985 to ask about the death penalty for 
selling drugs. Since then eleven surveys have asked about it, but their questions 
are so different that support ranges from 1% (AP/Media General, 11/86) in 
which only the 40% who said they favored the death penalty for crimes other than 
murder were asked about specific crimes, to 73% (Times Mirror, 5/90), in which 
42% of the population “strongly favored” and 31% “favored” the death penalty 
for “drug traffickers.” The idea of death for drug dealing is new, and question 
wordings suggest everything from the little kid who sells cocaine on his block to 
major drug “kingpins,” so it is impossible to say how the public feels on this 
issue. It is a new issue, a hot issue, the public is uncertain, and question wording 
makes a big difference. Not enough time has elapsed to observe trends on any 
particular question. 
Which Criminals Should be Punished with Death? 
Three groups-women, young people, and people suffering from mental 
retardation-have been singled out by survey researchers as possible exceptions 
to statutes authorizing the death penalty. In 1937, 58% of the population favored 
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the death penalty for women, about the same proportion as favored the death 
penalty in general (Gallup, 12/37). By 1953 the proportion had fallen to 51%: 
75% of those who favored the death penalty in general (68%) also favored it for 
women (Gallup, 1953). Although women are hardly ever sentenced to death, it 
appears that there is no overwhelming public sentiment against it; more likely it 
is because women are much less likely than men to commit capital murder 
(Rapaport, 1991). Since 1953 the question has not been included on any national 
survey. 
Support for the execution of young people (“under 21,” “under 18,” “teen- 
ager”) has risen dramatically since 1936, when this question was first asked. In 
1936, 28% of Americans were “in favor of the death penalty for persons under 
21” (Gallup, 12/36). By 1953 this proportion had dropped to 19%, and by 1957 it 
had dropped still further to 11% (Gallup, 11/53, 9/57). In 1965 it had risen to 
21% (Gallup, 1/65) even though general support for the death penalty was at its 
lowest. The question was not asked again until 1988 (Harris, 9/88) when 44% 
favored the death penalty for persons under 18, and in a 1989 poll (with a 
considerably smaller sample than the others) 57% favored the death penalty for 
16- and 17-year-olds (Time/CNN/Yankelovich, 6/89). While this last figure may 
be exaggerated, clearly the former reluctance to execute adolescents has been 
muted, perhaps because people’s current image of a violent killer is an adoles- 
cent. 
That these two recent polls do not reflect a willingness to execute all 
murderers is indicated by people’s views, on the same two polls, about the 
execution of “mentally retarded individuals.” In 1988 only 21% of the population 
favored the death penalty for mentally retarded killers; in 1989 the figure was 
27%. This lack of public support for the execution of mentally retarded offenders 
is particularly noteworthy because it has not been reflected either in practice- 
several retarded people have been executed and many more are awaiting 
execution-or in law. The Supreme Court held in 1989 that it does not offend 
public standards of morality to execute a person who was mentally retarded 
(Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302). 
No nationwide survey has asked about aggravating factors other than the 
type of crime and the demographic characteristics of the criminal. A few more 
limited-sample surveys provide some data about the kinds of cases that provoke 
the strongest support for the death penalty, the criminals the public most wants to 
see executed. Two characteristics stand out: (1) the murder was especially brutal 
(Haney et al., 1993; Harris, 1986), and (2) more than one person was killed 
(Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Haney et al., 1993; Harris, 1986). Although the data 
are sparse, it is plausible that these are the killers who come to mind when people 
are asked about the death penalty-the remorseless, brutal, uncontrollable killer. 
A few studies have found that people are far more likely to favor the death 
penalty in the abstract than they are to favor it in specific, concrete cases (Doob 
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& Roberts, 1984; Ellsworth, 1978; Fein & Lord, 1987), and have raised the 
hypothesis that this is because most real murderers seem less deviant and homble 
than the nightmare vision of a killer that comes to mind when we are asked about 
capital punishment. 
Conclusion 
Support for the death penalty is at an all time high, both in the proportion of 
Americans who favor capital punishment and in the intensity of their feelings. 
Most people care a great deal about the death penalty but know little about it, and 
have no particular desire to know. This is not surprising, as their attitudes are not 
based on knowledge. Although all justifications consistent with one’s position 
are typically endorsed, those that are offered spontaneously and endorsed most 
strongly are not the kind that could be easily changed by information. This 
characterization of death penalty attitudes is based on hypotheses that have been 
in the literature for nearly 20 years (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Sarat & Vidmar, 
1976); indeed, much of the work of the past 20 years has simply provided 
empirical support for old hypotheses rather than generating new ideas. In particu- 
lar, it does not explain why support for the death penalty has steadily increased 
beyond all previous levels. 
In the 1930s and 1940s pollsters rarely asked about the death penalty, 
probably because it was an accepted and uncontroversial fact of life. (Inter- 
estingly, two of the earliest death penalty questions on national polls-Gallup 
12/36 and Gallup 11153-were asked on the heels of unusual and highly pub- 
licized executions: Bruno Hauptmann for the Lindbergh baby kidnap-murder in 
April 1936, and the Rosenbergs for espionage in June 1953.) In any event, no 
trend can be inferred from the sketchy data that are available before the 1950s. 
Since then, however, overall trends in support for the death penalty have been 
well documented and, at the aggregate level, they seem easy to explain by 
reference to crime and homicide rates (Page & Shapiro, 1992, pp. 92-94; 
Rankin, 1979). The initial period of declining support (1953-1966) occurred at a 
time when the reported violent crime rate and the homicide rate were both 
comparatively low; the rapid increase in support that followed (1966- 1982) 
corresponded roughly to a period of rapid increase in both of these indices of 
criminal violence; and the current pattern of high but stable support (1982- 1992) 
developed in a period of high and reasonably stable violent crime and homicide 
rates. Figure 4 shows these trends. 
This is a simple commonsensical explanation: when crime goes up, people 
look for harsher punishments to bring it back down. Page and Shapiro report 
similar changes in the 1960s and 1970s for other sketchier attitudinal measures of 
punitiveness, such as the proportion of respondents who felt the courts are “not 








*-. _, .___. '. Criminal Homicides/lCOK 
. . .-.. .,__.--' 
t 
t Violent Crimed100K ___.-. 
1 
. ... . ' I' 
400 
5 
52 54 58 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 12 14 16 78 80 82 84 66 88 90 92 
Year 
Fig. 4. Support for the death penalty, and crime and homicide rates. Percentage of the population supporting the death penalty is 
represented in the scale on the left; see footnote I for data sources. The scale on the right axis represents the annual number of 
homicides per 100,ooO inhabitants and the scale on the extreme right represents the annual number of violent crimes per 100,OOO 
inhabitants; the data for the corresponding lines are from U.S. Department of Justice (1957-1990). 
f 
42 Ellsworth and Gross 
relationship between crime and death-penalty attitudes is bound to be more 
complicated. Public attitudes are not shaped by events themselves, but by public 
perception of those events. Thus it may be appropriate to assume a time lag 
between the reported crime rate and its impact on public opinion (Rankin, 1979), 
and it is likely that other factors-such as changes in media coverage- 
exaggerate or dampen the effects of the underlying phenomena. 
Despite these qualifications, the first two stages we have described seem 
clear enough: support for capital punishment declined when crime was low, and 
increased when it rose. What has happened since, and what to expect in the 
future, are different matters. For example, Fox et al. point out that the homicide 
rate peaked in 1980 at 10.2 (per 100,000 people), and declined to 8.4 by 1988, 
while support, if anything, increased slightly (1991, p. 509, Fig. 3). This could 
mean that the decrease in homicide had not yet been noticed and absorbed; for 
example, Fox et al. cite data that, in 1989, 82% of a national sample believed, 
erroneously, that crime was on the increase (Strasser, 1989). It could also mean 
that the decrease in homicide (assuming it was known) was too small or short 
term to matter. (And indeed, as Fig. 4 reveals, the homicide and crime rates have 
both increased again since 1987.) Finally, it is possible that this is not a symmet- 
rical relationship, at least not in the short run. People who came to support the 
death penalty because of increasing crime may not change their minds back once 
the crime rate goes down. Under some circumstances, they might interpret the 
decrease as evidence that the death penalty, or other punitive measures, were 
successful. 
Whatever the relationship between crime and support for the death penalty, it 
is not driven by personal experience. Many studies have shown that people who 
have been victimized themselves, or who fear for their personal safety, are no more 
likely to support the death penalty than those who have been more fortunate, or are 
less fearful (Fattah, 1979; Fox et al., 1991; Rankin, 1979; Smith, 1976; Stinch- 
combe et a]., 1980; Taylor, Scheppele, & Stinchcombe, 1979; Tyler & Weber, 
1982). On the other hand, a few studies have shown that concern about crime as a 
social issue is associated with support for capital punishment, if only weakly 
(Stinchcombe et al., 1980). If there is any one emotion that mediates between 
crime and support for the death penalty, it is probably frustration rather than fear. 
Year after year we live with high crime rates, we see graphic coverage of violence, 
we hear politicians promise to win the war against violence, against gangs, against 
drugs, against crime-but nothing changes. It is not hard to understand why many 
people support capital punishment even though they believe it does not deter crime 
and is not fair. The death penalty is concrete, it is forceful, and it is final (which 
nothing else seems to be); it is something, and being for it means that you insist that 
something be done. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, most research on capital punishment in the United 
States was addressed to constitutional issues that were pending in the Supreme 
Court. This explains the interest in deterrence in the early 1970s: the constitu- 
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tional significance of the deterrent effect of the death penalty was left open by the 
Furman decision in 1972. In 1976, however, in Cregg v. Georgia, the Court 
disposed of that issue by setting it aside, and interest in the topic diminished. 
Similarly, scholarly interest in death qualification was driven by the litigation 
leading up to the Supreme Court’s definitive rejection of social science research 
in Lockhart v. McCree (1986), and interest in racial discrimination in capital 
punishment peaked in preparation for the Court’s rejection of that claim in 
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987). To some extent, the same is true of research on 
attitudes toward capital punishment. Several of the best studies conducted in the 
1970s were addressed to Justice Marshall’s hypothesis in Furman that public 
support of the death penalty was caused by public ignorance, and several other 
studies since have also attempted to explain public attitudes in terms of the 
justifications for capital punishment that are described in Furman and Gregg: 
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation. 
But the arena has shifted. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has made it 
plain that it will do little to regulate the use of the death penalty, let alone abolish 
it. On the other hand, the death penalty has become an increasingly prominent 
issue in electoral politics, and in that sphere the salient issues may be quite 
different. The best example by far is the Bush-Dukakis presidential race in 1988. 
During the Carter presidency, from 1976 to 1980, the homicide and violent 
crime rates both rose sharply (see Fig. 4). President Carter supported the death 
penalty, but only in very limited circumstances; Governor Reagan-his oppo- 
nent for reelection in 1980-was strongly for it. Most Americans, however, 
probably never knew this since “crime” was not an issue in that election. Four 
years later, when President Reagan ran against Walter Mondale, support for the 
death penalty had risen to about current levels. Mondale was against capital 
punishment under all circumstances, but again the issue barely surfaced. The 
1988 presidential campaign started out the same way. In a national poll in May, 
respondents were asked which candidate “comes closer to your way of think- 
ing” on the death penalty; 18% chose Dukakis, 21% chose Bush, and 61% said 
there was no difference or had no opinion (Gallup, 5/88). We can only conclude 
that Dukakis’s position was not yet well known. In July, 15% said Dukakis had 
“the best policy on the death penalty,” 19% said Bush did, 14% were unsure, 
and nearly half--49%-had not heard enough to say ( L A .  Times, 7/88). That 
did not last. In October, 71% of a national sample correctly chose Dukakis 
as the candidate who opposed the death penalty (12% chose Bush; Gallup, 
10/88), and 63% of another national sample agreed that Dukakis “is too soft on 
law enforcement because he is against the death penalty and because he let a 
dangerous murderer go on furlough in Massachusetts, who then committed 
rape” (Harris, 10/88). By early November, respondents picked Bush over 
Dukakis as the candidate who would “do a better job of requiring the death 
penalty for crimes involving murder” by 61% to 24% (Yankelovitch, 11/88). 
After the election, 57% of Bush voters and 38% of Dukakis voters said the 
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death penalty was “very important” to them in deciding who to vote for (Gal- 
lup, 11/88). 
What happened between May and October is no secret. Starting in August, 
and accelerating in September after the national conventions were over, the Bush 
campaign drummed home the theme that is captured succinctly in the Harris poll 
question reproduced above: Dukakis is soft on crime because he is against the 
death penalty, and because he is responsible for the furlough of Willie Horton, 
the “dangerous murderer,” who immediately committed a vicious rape. The 
attention this issue received seems to have created a short-term spike in general 
support for capital punishment. In April 1988, the GSS measured support at 
71%. In the heat of the campaign, two Gallup polls, in September and in October 
of 1988, both found 79% support (an all-time record for “standard death penalty 
questions), and a CBS/N.Y. Times poll in October registered 78% support. A 
second CBSIN.Y. Times poll taken two months after the election, in January 
1989, was back at 71% support, and the 1989 GSS, in April of that year, found 
74% in favor of capital punishment. 
There are two major lessons to be learned from the Willie Horton campaign. 
The first is that (for now at least) a candidate for president must support the death 
penalty. Governor Clinton made his support clear by presiding over two execu- 
tions in Arkansas during the 1992 presidential campaign. As a result, the issue 
never surfaced in the presidential debates, in Republican campaign ads, or for 
that matter, in the national opinion polls-and Clinton won. Criminal justice in 
the United States is primarily a state and local function, and the federal death 
penalty in particular is a miniscule part of the nation’s capital punishment sys- 
tem. Nonetheless, it may be a long time before anyone who opposes the death 
penalty is considered eligible for a major party nomination. The death penalty 
was not always so powerful a political issue. In 1978 Governor Jerry Brown, a 
life-long opponent of capital punishment, won reelection in California on the 
same ballot on which 72% of the electorate voted for a death penalty referendum, 
despite the fact that he had vetoed death penalty legislation just the year before 
(Poulos, 1990). By 1990, the California Democratic gubernatorial primary 
seemed to have become a contest over which candidate could be counted on to 
put more people to death (Gross, 1993). 
The second lesson is that capital punishment, like violence and crime in 
general, is racially charged. It is no coincidence that Willie Horton is Black, or 
that the Bush campaign did everything humanly possible to make sure that every 
American voter got to see his picture. 
Some Future Directions 
Attitudes about capital punishment cannot be explained once and for all. 
Their meaning changes as the political climate changes, as the world changes, 
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and as the media change people’s perceptions of the world. New avenues of 
research are suggested. 
The Willie Horton episode epitomizes the importance of studying racial 
factors. To what extent do attitudes toward the death penalty draw strength from 
the increasing association of race and crime in White people’s minds? Not 
entirely, to be sure: the most horrifying criminals-Dahmer, Gacy, Bundy-are 
White, but these are the crazies, separate from people’s perceptions of routine 
out-of-control violence in our cities. The relations between attitudes toward 
Blacks, crime, and the death penalty have not been explored in any depth. A 
second, equally interesting and even more neglected topic is Black Americans’ 
attitudes toward capital punishment. Always more opposed than Whites, always 
more conscious of its discriminatory application, Blacks nonetheless are now 
more likely to favor the death penalty than to oppose it. It is very unlikely that the 
dynamics of Black attitudes are the same as those of the Whites, but there is no 
research on the topic. 
Bowers’ (1993) finding that people prefer guaranteed life imprisonment to 
the death penalty also raises new questions. In his research, the motives of 
incapacitation and retribution are inextricably confounded. If people were satis- 
fied that a murderer could never commit another crime, would that be enough, or 
must he also suffer? What would people say if asked, “Would you rather Willie 
Horton was sentenced for life to a pleasant but utterly secure prison in Tahiti, 
with no possibility of ever returning to society, or would you rather he was 
sentenced to a vicious overcrowded maximum security prison for 30 years?’ We 
have not moved far in untangling utilitarian and emotional bases for death penai- 
ty attitudes. 
People’s feelings about the death penalty are intense, yet we still have done 
very little to explore the underlying emotions. Research suggests that fear is not 
the driving emotion. Future research should focus on other emotions, particularly 
frustration and anger. Anger is the most positive of the negative emotions, 
because it is the only one that confers a sense of power (Ellsworth & Smith, 
1988; Roseman, 1984). When politicians argue, angrily, for the death penalty, 
they may communicate that they are in control, and at the same time arouse a 
satisfying sense of outrage and power in the voter. This is, of course speculation; 
the emotional dynamics of death penalty attitudes may be quite different. But 
there is no doubt that emotions play a role, and so far there has been little effort to 
understand that role. 
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Appendix. Surveys on General Death Penalty Attitudes 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26 1406 72 23 5 
27 2993 75 17 8 
28 1570 70 22 8 
29 2405 74 16 10 
30 4244 72 23 5 
29 3583 69 18 13 
(continued) 
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Do you believe in the death penalty for murder? 
Do you favor or oppose capital punishment for murder? 
Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 
Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 
Do you believe in capital punishmentideath penalty or are you opposed to it? 
Do you approve or disapprove of the death penalty? 
Are you in favor of or opposed to the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? 
Do you, in general, favor or oppose the death penalty for individuals convicted of 
Do you favor or oppose the death penalty? 
I’m going to read you some proposals that are being discussed around the country 
serious crimes, such as murder? 
today. As I read each proposal, please tell me whether you would favor or oppose 
it. . . . A death penalty for persons convicted of murder. 
Variations 
Do you think that having a death penalty for the worst crimes is a good idea or are 
Do you feel that all persons convicted of first degree murder should get the death 
you against the death penalty? 
penalty, that no one convicted of first degree murder should get the death penalty, 
or do you feel that whether or not someone convicted of first degree murder gets 
the death penalty should depend on the circumstances of the case and the charac- 
ter of the person? 
Suppose that on election day, November 5 (1974), you could vote on these key is- 
sues. Please tell me how you would vote on each, remembering that you should 
try to vote for or against each proposition just as you would in a regular referen- 
dum. Proposition 1: Death Penalty. . . . I (favor/oppose) the death penalty for 
persons convicted of murder. 
Opinions differ as to whether there should be a death penalty for certain very serious 
crimes, or whether there should not be a death penalty for any crime, no matter 
how serious it is. How do you feel-are you in favor of the death penalty for cer- 
tain crimes, or opposed to the death penalty under any circumstances? 
(continued) 






















Are there any crimes for which you think the death penalty is justified? 
Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear cut side that people take, and 
also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out by compromise. 
But I’m going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me 
whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it? Im- 
posing the death penalty on those convicted of serious crimes such as murder, 
kidnapping, etc. 
[Here are] [This card lists] various proposals being discussed in this country today. 
Would you tell me whether you generally favor or generally oppose each of these 
proposals? . . . A mandatory death penalty for anyone convicted of murder. 
Do you personally hope that the Reagan administration will or will not work to see 
that: The death penalty is reinstituted? 
Now I’d like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the 
country. Do you favor or oppose: . . . Wider use of the death penalty for certain 
crimes such as hijacking or the killing of a police officer? 
Suppose that on Election Day, November 2 (1982), you could vote on key issues as 
well as candidates. Please tell me how you would vote on each of these proposi- 
tions. . . . I (favorloppose) the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. 
Do you favor or oppose bringing back the death penalty? 
Various proposals have been made as possible solutions to the increased crime rate. 
Please tell me whether you personally favor or oppose the following as measures 
to reduce the crime rate. Death penalty. 
In general, do you feel the death penalty should be allowed in all murder cases, only in 
certain murder cases, or should there be no death penalty at all? 
Are there circumstances under which you think the death penalty is justified? 
Let me read you a number of different proposals people have made about how to 
change the U.S. (United States) Constitution. For each proposal, please tell me 
whether you would favor or oppose this change in the Constitution. Amending the 
Constitution to outlaw the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment. . . . 
Would you favor or oppose this change in the Constitution? [“Oppose” coded as 
“javor death penalty” ] 
Scale-answer questions 
Do you approve or disapprove of the death penalty? Do you feel strongly about that, 
or not so strongly? 
Generally speaking, are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of mur- 
der, or are you opposed to that-or haven’t you heard enough about that to say? 
Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (If “Fa- 
vor” or “Oppose,” ask:) How strongly do you (favorioppose) the death penalty for 
persons convicted of murder-very strongly or not too strongly? 
Generally speaking, are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of 
murder, or are you opposed to that- or haven’t you heard enough about that to 
say? (If in favor or opposed) Is that (in favor/opposed) strongly or (in favor/ 
opposed) somewhat? 
The following is a list of some programs and proposals that are being discussed in 
this country today. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, 
oppose, or strongly oppose. . . . A mandatory death penalty for anyone convicted 
of premeditated murder. 
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